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general notion of self-trust seems to me the strongest candidate to date 
in support of treating our non-epistemic selves—e.g., desires, attitudes, 
emotions (particularly admiration), etc.—in roughly parallel fashion to 
our epistemic selves, and this approach culminates in particularly impres¬
sive fashion in making sense of the complex character of communities and 
traditions (chaps. 7-9). Scope and unification are two important virtues of 
systematic accounts and I think even Zagzebski's most staunch critics w i l l 
appreciate their exemplification in her self-trust-based theory. She laments 
at the outset of her monograph that "rarely we do get . . . any attempt 
to connect epistemic authority wi th the literature on authority in moral 
and political philosophy" (1). Her book is an impressive response to that 
lament, starting f rom the ground up, f rom trust to authority. The scope of 
Zagzebski's account unifies the issues addressed in her book wi th diverse 
philosophical literature, and of course wi th several ongoing debates in 
epistemology. Epistemic Authority w i l l be of interest to a broad readership, 
including moral philosophers and social and political philosophers. It is 
also essential reading for any epistemologist interested in trust, testimony, 
or any topic fall ing under the label "social epistemology." 
Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre 
to Kierkegaard, by John J. Davenport. N e w York: Routledge, 2012. Pp. xv + 
230. £85/$140 (hardback); £29.99/$49.95 (paper). 
Self, Value and Narrative: A Kierkegaardian Approach, by Anthony Rudd. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. x i i i + 268. £42/$75 (hardback). 
J O H N LIPPITT, University of Hertfordshire, U K , and Deakin University, 
Australia. 
The turn to narrative in accounts of practical identity has been contro¬
versial. The claim that narrative is central to the intelligibility of human 
lives—found in such thinkers as MacIntyre, Ricoeur and Schechtman— 
has generated great interest but faced numerous objections. For instance: 
Does the narrative identity approach confuse stories wi th their subjects? 
Does it construe "narrative" too strongly, smuggling literary properties 
into human lives in misleading ways, or does it construe "narrative" so 
weakly that its claims become trivial? Alongside this general debate, there 
has been a parallel discussion in Kierkegaard studies. Several essays in 
Davenport and Rudd's edited collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre (2001) 
advanced a view that Kierkegaard is himself committed to a view of "nar¬
rative unity" importantly similar to MacIntyre's, and that Kierkegaard's 
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work sheds light on normative aspects of narrative practical identity typi¬
cally overlooked in the wider debate. Over the last decade, various scepti¬
cal questions have been raised of Kierkegaardian narrativists: some akin 
to those raised in the wider debate, some more specifically Kierkegaard-
ian in focus. The latter include: Do attempts to explain the aesthetic-ethical 
distinction in terms of narrative unity overlook the diversity of aestheti-
cism, focusing excessively on Either/Or's A alone? Doesn't Kierkegaard 
demonstrate key senses (such as in ethical and religious choice) in which 
"self" refers not to something best understood in terms of narrative, but to 
an entity fully present now? Kierkegaard has thus been presented both as 
a narrativist and as someone deeply sceptical about some of narrativism's 
claims. These two fine books make distinct but overlapping contributions 
to the "pro-narrative" side of this debate, both defending forms of narra¬
tive realism. 
Disclosure time: I am not a neutral observer with respect to either book. 
Davenport cites some embryonic sceptical remarks I made about the 
"MacIntyrean Kierkegaardian" project in a paper at the A P A in December 
2004 as the prompt for the main ideas in his project, and his book is 
presented to a significant degree as a detailed response to the related 
critique I worked out in subsequent publications. Rudd acknowledges 
both Davenport and myself as dialogue partners on this topic for many 
years, noting the former's "more or less parallel project" to his own and my 
own "searching criticisms of those projects, which helped me to articulate 
much more clearly to myself what I wanted to defend" (vi). 
There are new arguments here, and the positions Davenport and Rudd 
had presented in earlier work are considerably enriched. But there are 
also various clarifications and some concessions to the sceptical critique, 
such that the gap between narrativists and narratosceptics seems to have 
narrowed. For instance, both Davenport and R u d d now more explicitly 
acknowledge the importance of welcoming a plurality of goods into our 
lives, and that a degree of existential risk is necessary and desirable in the 
well-lived life. This review w i l l not allow space for any significant ad¬
vance in this debate beyond those made in the books reviewed. 1 I shall 
merely offer a summary of each book i n turn; briefly suggest a couple of 
criticisms; and, by way of comparing the two books, say something about 
how each has an important strength compared to the other. 
Going beyond his earlier contributions, Davenport advances a com¬
plex, five-level account of "narrative unity." 1n the scene-setting chapter 
1, he develops the distinction (found i n Korsgaard and Schechtman) be¬
tween practical and theoretical identity and the relevance of narrative 
thereto. Chapter 2 summarises recent objections to narrative theories of 
the self in both the general and specifically Kierkegaardian literature. 
1 A forthcoming collection of essays aims to do so: see Narrative, Identity and the Kierkeg-
aardian Self, ed. John Lippitt and Patrick Stokes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Universi ty Press, 
2015). 
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Davenport distinguishes different levels of narrative continuity relevant 
to practical identity, supporting MacIntyre's v iew that intentional action 
has a narrative form. However, he argues that action is one of several 
types of experience that form narratival connections as agents live their 
lives "prior to autobiographical reflection and other narration" (8). Here 
the charge is that opponents (and some narrativists) commit the "logos 
fallacy" of equating "narrative structure wi th a rendition or account" (53). 
This introduces the first of eight theses that summarise Davenport's new 
position. Against the objection that whereas stories are artifacts, whole 
human lives aren't, Davenport offers the analogy thesis: "the truthmaker 
of a biographical narrative itself has something much like the multidi¬
mensional weave of temporally extended meaning-relations that we find 
in stories" (55). This truthmaker Davenport names a temporal being's nar-
ravive, connoting "a story that lives, the development of which is, for the 
most part, prior to its telling or rational interpretation" (71). The most 
basic level of narravive arrives pre-consciously, and these narravive con¬
nections are necessary for basic planning agency. But chapter 3 goes on to 
argue that personal autonomy—a feature considered key to Kierkegaard's 
aesthetic-ethical distinction—involves higher levels of narrative unity 
beyond this. Against the objection that the distinction between aesthetic 
and ethical selfhood cannot adequately be explained in terms of greater 
narrative unity, Davenport seeks to offer no fewer than five different levels 
of narrative unity. 
Unity-0 is a pre-reflective recognition of ourselves as the same subject 
of consciousness over time. Unity-1 (the unity of "planning agency") "is 
found i n the lives of all agents wi th responsibilities ranging over extended 
plans" (45). Davenport now agrees that Either/Or's aesthetes, such as A 
and the Seducer, possess both these levels of unity (47). What they lack, 
he claims, is unity-2: "continuity of cares through wi l led devotion to ends, 
persons and ideals" (47^8). It is commitments involving higher-order vo¬
litions (in a broadly Frankfurtian sense) which sustain the agent's projects 
and relationships over time. Neither aesthete recognises the existence of 
values that have normative authority for their cares (107). Thus they also 
lack unity-3, which amounts to a revised version of Frankfurtian "whole-
heartedness," i n which one is fu l ly dedicated to the goals of each of one's 
cares, has no conflicting higher-order volitions, has no essential conflict 
between the strong evaluations grounding different cares, and where 
one makes a "reasonable effort" to balance them and reduce pragmatic 
conflict between them, while "remaining open" to learning new values 
and accepting criticism of existing cares. Finally, there is unity-4, a moti¬
vating ideal of "perfect harmony" that, i n a concession to the "mortality 
objection" (that narrative intelligibility is threatened by the interruption of 
life by death), Davenport admits that we w i l l never achieve (at least this 
side of death, such that here a k ind of eschatological faith in post-mortem 
survival is required). He grants that "the narrative structure of practical 
identity is incomplete in the final analysis because it points towards an 
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eschatological telos in which we can only have faith" (166). This introduces 
the importance of Tolkienian eucatastrophe, on which Davenport has writ¬
ten interestingly elsewhere, and the related importance of hope. 
Here we see something of the narrowing of the narrativist-narratoscep-
tic gap. Davenport acknowledges that "MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians" 
had previously placed too much focus on A in judging "the aesthetic" 
(193n32), and now includes fuller discussions of different kinds of 
Kierkegaardian aesthete. A s noted, he also acknowledges the importance 
of giving fu l l recognition to a wide plurality of values in a human life. 
Indeed, Davenport now explicitly dismisses monomania, lack of imagina¬
tion and so on as inadequate ways of getting wholeheartedness "on the 
cheap" (112). Also built into the account is the explicit need for avoiding 
self-deceptive stories about oneself: "the caring that is psychologically 
necessary for formal autonomy involves a rational commitment to avoid 
self-deceptive stories about one's practical identity" (117). How we avoid 
akrasia, self-indulgent illusions and the like still remains somewhat ob¬
scure to me (more of this later), and Davenport admits that "maybe no one 
avoids them completely" (118). 
But Davenport argues that his new model allows a response to several 
objections. For instance, the response to the fact-value objection—if narrative 
unity is a constitutive condition of having a life at all, how can it have nor¬
mative implications?—is that there are basic levels of unity that are consti¬
tutive, and higher levels that are normative. Narravive plays a crucial role 
in the mimetic thesis, according to which "the basic human capacity to make 
secondary narratives . . . is derived from our experience in l iving out primary 
narratives" (57). However, Davenport acknowledges, v ia the incompleteness 
thesis, that even the best literary or biographical depictions of a life "neces¬
sarily fall short of the almost infinite detail of significance in actual l ived 
experience, which is always charged with potential resonances between 
experiences in past, present, and the anticipated future" (58). However, 
this doesn't imply that the more detail, the better the biography, because 
"the purpose of most types of secondary narrative is not to chronicle as 
many different points as possible in the weave of significance that gave 
the real person's life its unity-0 and unity-1. This point is obscured by the 
selectivity objection because it fails to distinguish primary and secondary 
narratives" (59). 
Is this charge of where the obscurity lies fair? The "selectivity objec¬
tion" was always about what Davenport now calls secondary narratives, 
and only on something like the narravive assumption does this notion of 
a "primary narrative" gain any purchase. I think Davenport would ac¬
knowledge that he was not clear about this distinction in earlier work. One 
of the strengths of this book is its willingness to tell narrativists what they 
need to be clearer about (the unclarity of precisely what narrativism com¬
mits us to being a major complaint of the earlier narratosceptic critique). 
In the controversial idea of a narravive, Davenport shows himself wi l l ing 
to bite an important bullet, in answering the question of how "that which 
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gets articulated can have something like a narrative structure before it is 
articulated" (64). A s he acknowledges, many prominent narrativists are 
not committed to the k ind of strong narrative realism to which he (and 
Rudd) subscribe. A n d it is here, I think, that we might reasonably ask for 
more detail: it still remains somewhat mysterious in precisely what sense 
a narravive is "l ike" an articulated narrative, and in what sense it is not. 
H o w do secondary self-narratives enter into our narravive? Here 
Davenport offers the articulation thesis, attributed to Schechtman, in which 
from early in life, the narravive of one's practical identity combines "more 
or less tacit self-understandings" with "interpretations explicitly worked 
out in thorough meditation on oneself" (95), the latter tending to be more 
important at higher levels of narrative unity. To this he adds the existential 
coherence thesis, according to which autonomy requires both "that we freely 
form and maintain cares and commitments to long-term ends, and . . . can 
consciously reflect and w i l l as needed to make our cares into an essentially 
coherent narrative whole in which integrity and wholeheartedness are 
possible" (97). Since as stated this is open to the worry that a focus on unity 
might bl ind us to potential new possibilities (the "missing the adventure" 
objection), as well as Strawson's objections about "episodics," Davenport 
notes that this thesis "does not claim that all the conditions of personal 
autonomy can be derived from, or encapsulated in, the idea of narrative 
unity among ends, life-goals, and ground projects" (98). Something similar 
is true of the ethical thesis: "personal autonomy and the k ind of narrative 
unity it involves cannot be developed without taking seriously (as person¬
ally relevant to one's life) ethical ideals and moral obligations with objec¬
tive status" (98). Like Rudd, Davenport insists he is not claiming that the 
content of "the ethical" be derived from unity-2. From Rudd he derives 
the regulative thesis about unity-3, which stresses the need for harmony 
between first-order cares, such that how 1 achieve any given goal needs to 
be weighed against other goals: it would be a pragmatic contradiction not 
to care about such regulation (115). 
Chapter 4 argues that i n his signed writings Kierkegaard offers a nar¬
rative conception of mature practical identity. But here the primary reli¬
ance is upon Purity of Heart. Davenport claims that the ideal of that name, 
taken to be Kierkegaard's ideal of ethical agency and treated as a k ind 
of wholeheartedness, is an especially strong form of narrative unity, key 
to the structure of which is infinite resignation. He glosses Kierkegaard's 
purity of heart thesis ("the person who wills one thing that is not the good 
is actually not wi l l ing one thing" (135)) thus: "every volitional stance or 
set of cares not governed by second-order perfectionist ethical ends wi l led 
to the point of infinite resignation cannot become synchronically whole¬
hearted and remain so over time even in the face of death" (135). Hence 
the final thesis about unity-3: wi l l ing to do and suffer "everything for the 
good" means "to will, in the decision, to be and to remain with the good" (145). 
This is not a single moment of decision, but repetition. "1nfinite resignation 
is a k ind of infinite 'patience,' and volitional unity requires such patience" 
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(145). This links wholeheartedness of w i l l wi th religious faith, because for 
Kierkegaard "the only way to secure infinite resignation for the long-run 
is to trust in the 'eternal victory' of the good 'wi th the eyes of faith '" (146). 
If this has brought us into the territory of the religious, chapter 5 enters 
it fu l ly wi th a discussion of mortality, eschatology and faith. Davenport's 
response to the "mortality objection" rests i n part on the claim that our 
life-story can become a whole "by anticipating the point at which we w i l l 
no longer be able to change the meaning of our l ife" (10), one of his key 
examples here being Abraham Lincoln (159). I cannot do justice to this 
discussion here (or to Davenport's response to the "4D objection" raised 
by Patrick Stokes), but one worry 1 am left wi th is that only a proportion 
of human lives can be dealt wi th in such a way. What certainly emerges 
clearly, however, is the importance to Kierkegaard of the eschatological 
significance of the self. 
Anthony Rudd's book also tackles large philosophical questions about 
value and the self. It develops a view of the self that he calls NEST: that 
it is—in senses the book seeks to work out—Narrative, Evaluative, Self-
constituting and Teleological (2). Rudd's version of NEST is, he claims, 
"specifically Kierkegaardian" (3), reporting that although he had origi¬
nally intended to write about the general debate without much reference 
to Kierkegaard, he ultimately found the Dane "inescapable" (3), Kierkeg¬
aard more than any other writer showing h im the necessity of the connec¬
tions between each element of the NEST thesis. 
The book divides into three parts, each with three chapters. In chapter 
1, drawing on Schechtman but adapting her terminology, Rudd presents 
the importance of a creative tension between two intuitively plausible but 
incomplete ideas: "self-acceptance" (the self is in some sense given by our 
limitations and certain biological and historical facts) and "self-shaping" 
(the self is something we have to work at forming or constituting). Chap¬
ter 2, drawing on MacIntyre, argues that a view capable of doing justice 
to both ideas was the teleological v iew of classical virtue ethics, but— 
pace MacIntyre—that its most promising hopes for revival draw less on 
Aristotle than Plato. Intriguingly but controversially (as Rudd recognises 
[40, 49-50]), Kierkegaard emerges as the richest modern proponent of a 
broadly Platonist v iew of the self, in which "the elements that constitute 
the self can only be held together i n a properly creative tension if the self 
as a whole is oriented to an objective (Platonic) Good" (6). In unpacking 
the account of the self in The Sickness Unto Death, R u d d reads Kierkeg¬
aard as presenting the self as a self-conscious, active synthesising of our 
immanence or limitations (time, finitude, necessity) and our powers of 
transcendence (eternity, infinitude, freedom) (41^2). The self is the ten¬
sion between self-shaping and self-acceptance—the struggle presented 
as "the central theme of [Kierkegaard's] philosophical career" (39)—in 
that the self is "something that exists in and through the shaping of itself 
and in constantly negotiating the limits of what it can and cannot alter" 
(43). Chapter 3 defends well the existence of a relatively stable character 
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(including virtue) against sceptics such as John Doris: this matters for 
Rudd's thesis insofar as "self-shaping" is to be understood as shaping 
one's character. 
Chapters 4 to 6 seek to defend this "Kierkegaardian" view of the self and 
its orientation to the Good in the context of contemporary debates. Thus 
chapter 4 engages Frankfurt and his critics, to advance the view that to be 
a person is to possess the capacity for effective self-evaluation: a capacity 
that depends (contra Frankfurt) on objectively real values which provide 
the measure to which such self-scrutiny appeals. Selfhood involves both 
character and personhood ("a capacity to distance oneself f rom and thus 
to work at changing that character" [6]). In chapter 5, R u d d defends this 
ethical realism against alternatives (Frankfurt's evaluative anti-realism; 
Korsgaard's constructivism; Foot's neo-Aristotelian naturalism). Chapter 
6 offers an account of how self-shaping and self-acceptance can be recon¬
ciled if one is oriented both to what has objective value and that for which 
one has an "affinity" (our being drawn to this person rather than that, in 
personal love; devoting our talents to goods to which we can ful ly commit 
rather than goods to which we feel only a sense of obligation). Contrary 
to prophets of authenticity per se, Kierkegaard recognises our teleological 
needs, and takes us to have a natural attunement towards the Good (albeit 
one that we sometimes deny and repress). 
Chapters 7 to 9 address narrative. In an introduction to part three, R u d d 
suggests that partial self-shaping requires the self to become (in part) the 
author of its own story, and he reprises his view that the ethicist Judge 
Wi l l i am is committed to "something like Mac1ntyre's notion of narrative 
unity" (168). To narratosceptics, the "something like" is precisely what 
had been obscure i n Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, and Rudd now makes 
some important clarifications. First, he acknowledges that narrative unity 
cannot be "a neutral, non-ethical good," but is itself an "inextricably ethi¬
cal notion" (170). The solution to my earlier objection—that narrative intel-
ligibility cannot be necessary for selfhood as such and the distinguishing 
mark of the ethical as opposed to the aesthetic—is said to rest in degrees 
of selfhood, and in the picture R u d d goes on to sketch of the aesthete as a 
partial, divided self; self-deceived and repressed. This hints at one of the 
most interesting aspects of Rudd's book, namely Kierkegaard's "theory of 
repression" (discussed in chapter 9). 
Against this background, chapter 7 seeks to respond to general sceptics 
about narrative, and argues that a self-conscious temporal agent can be 
understood only in narrative terms (175-176). Here a second clarification 
is important. Rudd's understanding of narrative is stipulative: fol lowing 
Mac1ntyre rather than, say, Dennett or Velleman, Rudd presents narra¬
tive as intelligibility-oriented, and he dismisses views whereby selves 
are (perhaps necessary) fictions. This is helpful, insofar as it explicitly 
clarifies much of what was only latent in some of the earlier discussion. 
Rudd suggests the fact that such different positions talk of "narrativity" 
should not lead us to see them as having anything substantive in common 
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(177). However, what is sauce for the goose here is sauce for the gander: 
Rudd might do more to distinguish such distinct positions as radical anti-
narrativists (such as Strawson) and more modest narratosceptics (like 
Peter Lamarque and myself) whom he tends to lump together under de-
scriptors such as "opponents of narrative theory." (For instance, I entirely 
agree with Rudd, in his chapter 8 account of Strawson's episodic ethics, 
that the latter gives an inadequate account of friendship and undervalues 
the importance of guilt.) Part of the point made by the latter camp was 
the unclarity of the term "narrative" as used in the earlier debate, and, 
in Lamarque's words, that we should not "expect too much" of it. Rudd's 
acknowledgement that the positions of "narrativists" can be radically dif¬
ferent (even incompatible) lends some support to the objection that the 
terminology may be less than optimal—though, as I noted at the outset, 
clarity on what both Rudd and Davenport are committed to in using this 
terminology has been vastly enhanced by these two volumes. What is also 
helpfully made clearer here is Rudd's commitment to the MacIntyrean 
idea that selfhood and narrative are mutually presupposing (176, 185), which 
does distinguish this position f rom some others available in the literature. 
Chapter 8 tries to show why ethical self-evaluation must take a nar¬
rative form, also addressing ethical objections to narrative (such as the 
"missing the adventure" objection) which Rudd denies are a problem for 
his narrativism. Here he defends—as a normative not merely descrip¬
tive claim—what Schechtman calls "strong narrativism." I return to this 
shortly. Finally, chapter 9 tackles another key objection, the self's tendency 
towards self-deception, connecting Kierkegaard with psychoanalysis. 
In a very interesting discussion, Rudd addresses the important fact that 
much of the self is unknown to itself. Acknowledging the importance of 
self-deception and fantasy as threats to self-understanding, he claims that 
self-shaping requires "imagination and proper emotional responsiveness" 
(229) to these threats. In a departure f rom Davenport's approach, Rudd 
explores the value of psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic tool in the pursuit 
of self-knowledge. Insisting on the necessity of narrative, Rudd argues that 
good psychotherapy enables us to replace inferior narratives about our¬
selves with better, more truthful, ones. Though Rudd draws explicitly on 
Freud, and to a greater extent Jung, much of what he says about psycho¬
analysis is also true of at least some non-psychoanalytic psychotherapy, 
and this is a topic that warrants further discussion. 2 The use made of Jung 
suggests one k ind of difference between Rudd and Davenport. Criticising 
those aspects of Freud that encourage us to identify to an excessive extent 
with the conscious ego, Rudd draws on Jung to suggest that the I needs to 
learn from—and not just about—the unconscious; to let itself be shaped by 
the unconscious (239). Rudd sees important parallels between Jung and 
2 Though as I have argued elsewhere, there might be Kierkegaardian reasons for concern 
about the practice of certain forms of psychotherapy that valorise the client's own judge¬
ments as unchallengable. 
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Kierkegaard, though what makes Kierkegaard's view of repression distinc¬
tive is that we repress our need for the Good (239). In this sense, Kierkegaard 
goes beyond Jung's primary concern with psychic harmony (say, between 
a person's introvert and extrovert aspects) to a concern also with relations 
with others and with the good (244). Nevertheless, Rudd sees Jungian in¬
tegration as an important complement to the ethical understanding of the 
self his book seeks to develop, such that this integration is an ethical or 
evaluative goal (245). A n d psychotherapy can have a normative dimen¬
sion, such that the process of understanding oneself and the Good can go 
hand in hand (245-246). 
Rudd describes his approach as Kierkegaardian, but "brackets off" 
any distinctively theistic (let alone Christian) dimension of Kierkegaard's 
thought. (So in his account of the Kierkegaardian self in chapter 2, the 
idea that the self "rests transparently in the power that established it" is 
somewhat underplayed.) I think this is a deliberate strategic decision: one 
cannot cover everything, and the breadth of material Rudd has covered is 
impressive. But as regards the "Kierkegaardian" claim, I think this strat-
egy comes at a greater price than he acknowledges. 3 In seeking to root their 
positions in Kierkegaard's signed writings, both Rudd and Davenport lean 
heavily on themes from Purity of Heart. But what about other discourses? 
Rudd's "strong narrativism" involves "actively and consciously" under¬
taking to understand one's life "as a story, wi th a unified theme and little 
or no extraneous material" (Schechtman, cited 205). It interests me that 
this sounds very much like what Kierkegaard cautions us against in his 
reflections on what we are to learn f rom the lilies of the field and the birds 
of the air in his discourses on Matthew 6. Such self-focus introduces worry, 
the opposite of that contentment with being a human being that the lilies 
and birds teach. I do not see how we could take Rudd's advice without 
introducing comparison, which Kierkegaard presents there as precisely the 
threat to contentment. (This comparison does not have to be with others, 
but could be with a better version of ourselves: 1 find the story of how 
the "naughty little bird . . . the restless mentality of comparison" 4 worries 
the l i ly into destruction amongst the saddest—yet most psychologically 
astute—passages in Kierkegaard's oeuvre. A key message of the parable is 
that our common humanity matters more than our diversity.) 1nterestingly, 
this seems to be Kierkegaard's version of the Strawson-valorised "happy-
go-lucky . . . letting be" that Rudd critiques (218). Rudd does acknowledge 
that there is something of this k ind of thought in Kierkegaard (219), but it 
would be interesting to know what he makes specifically of the important 
lilies and birds discourses: this biblical passage so fascinated Kierkegaard 
31 leave to one side the more specific question of whether the Kierkegaardian self can ad¬
equately be treated without taking into account Kierkegaard's Lutheran Protestant heritage. 
For more on this, see Matias M 0 l Dalsgaard, "Non-Narrat ive Protestant goods: Protestant 
ethics and Kierkegaardian selfhood," in Lippit t and Stokes. 
^Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. and trans. H o w a r d V. H o n g and Edna H . 
H o n g (Princeton: Princeton Universi ty Press, 1993), 169. 
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that he returned to it on numerous occasions. They present, I think, a 
picture significantly different f rom the pro-narrative conclusions Rudd 
draws f rom his discussion of related themes in Strawson and Velleman. 
What is commended—to take joy in "today" and to view as irrelevant 
"tomorrow" 5—seems to leave little room for a focus on narrative unity. The 
joy that the lilies and birds teach is said to put "the whole emphasis on: the 
present time."6 In a related discourse, Kierkegaard describes "the next day" 
as "the grappling hook with which the huge mass of worries seizes hold of 
the single individual's little ship"; 7 thus "if a person is to gain mastery over 
his mind, he must begin by getting r id of the next day."8 The silence that 
the l i ly and bird also teach human beings is explicitly l inked to forgetting 
oneself and one's plans.9 
Whether the Kierkegaard of these discourses could generate a plausible 
account of practical identity, 1 don't know. A n d in drawing attention to 
this, I am not recommending a life of total que sera sera passivity, merely 
suggesting that the dial might, for Kierkegaard, often be closer to self-
acceptance and further from self-shaping than Rudd's strong narrativism. 1 0 
(I also think that what self-acceptance means looks very different in the light 
of Kierkegaard's Protestant commitment to the idea that each individual's 
specific life and task is God-given and thus infinitely valuable: this intro¬
duces an important dimension lacking from a focus on self-acceptance as 
givenness of time and kind or even of stable character-possession.) Perhaps 
this relates to Eleanor Helms's suggestion that the self is better understood as 
a reader than a narrator or co-author (179, 206). Just as the task of a reader is 
to hope, perhaps the self is best understood as one who always hopes to find 
"narrative unity" in the world— yet recognises her own powerlessness to bring 
this about.11 A n d ultimately, this cannot be divorced from Kierkegaard's faith 
in God. There do seem to be crucial differences between Platonic commit¬
ment to the Good and the radicality of dependence upon G o d that is central 
to so many of Kierkegaard's discourses. In this sense, perhaps Rudd's strong 
narrativism is more "ethical" than ful ly "religious." Davenport's recogni¬
tion of the importance of infinite resignation is a pertinent advance here 
(though the lilies and birds discourses also raise questions about whether 
5Without Authority, ed. and trans. H o w a r d V. H o n g and Edna H . H o n g (Princeton: Princ-
eton Universi ty Press, 1997), 38. 
6 Ibid. , 39. 
^Christian Discourses, ed. and trans. H o w a r d V. H o n g and Edna H . H o n g (Princeton: 
Princeton Universi ty Press, 1997), 72, translation amended. 
8 Ibid. , 71. 
9Without Authority, 19. 
1 0 Dalsgaard draws attention to this aspect of the lilies and the birds in the essay cited 
above, and implici t ly—yet in more detail—in his delightful epistolary novel Don't Despair: 
Letter to a Modern Man, trans. Patrick Stokes (London: Pine Tribe, 2014). 
1 1 Eleanor Helms, "The E n d in the Beginning: Eschatology in Kierkegaard's Literary Criti¬
cism," in Lippit t and Stokes. Compare here "the one who prays aright," w h o goes f rom being 
a speaker to being a listener (Without Authority, 11-12). 
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autonomy is really as central to Kierkegaard as it is to Davenport, and I 
wonder whether they don't also pose problems for part of his solution to 
the mortality objection). In this sense, there is a price to be paid for Rudd's 
"bracketing off" any distinctively Christian or even theistic dimension of 
Kierkegaard's thought. He denies that he is committed to an overplanned 
life (217-220). But perhaps the lilies and birds discourses might begin to 
show why "strong narrativism" w i l l still strike some of us as precisely that. 
For this Kierkegaard, it is not just monomaniacal career obsessives and the 
like who have strayed too far from self-acceptance in the direction of self-
shaping: it is the human norm—and this is our problem. 
1f Davenport's closer attention to Kierkegaard's "religious" sphere might 
serve as an advance on Rudd's position, let me close with a way in which I 
think this corrective works the other way around. I refer to Rudd's focus on 
the importance of unconscious repression. In several of Davenport's formal 
stipulations (such as those regarding entertaining risks but not taking them 
lightly, and being wil l ing to tolerate "for a time" conflicts amongst cares), 1 
wonder if this is adequate to addressing practical issues at the level of the 
phenomenology of an actual lived life. Specifically, Davenport sometimes 
seems to present agents as having an implausibly reliable view of the ele¬
ments they need to evaluate (downplaying the threat of self-deception). For 
instance, his reply to the "selectivity objection" acknowledges that one can 
thematise only a finite subset of "meaning-relations" in one's narravive, but 
claims that this need not amount to self-deception provided one focuses as 
honestly as possible on the most relevant subset thereof. This may be an 
ideal, but to someone impressed by Rudd's chapter 9, as I am, it is likely to 
sound a bit psychologically naive. Rudd acknowledges the sheer difficulty 
of self-knowledge because of self-deception and unconscious repression. 
But Davenport, replying to the self-deception objection, stresses the impor¬
tance of a "rational commitment to avoid self-deceptive stories about one's 
practical identity" (117), since without this one is pragmatically inconsis-
tent—and such a self-conception "is liable to collapse rapidly under any 
significant pressure f rom external reality" (118). Despite his concession that 
"maybe no one avoids . . . completely" (118) such self-deception, he seems 
to underestimate the extent to which one might live a radically self-deceived 
life without ever becoming sufficiently aware of this. For every Scrooge 
or Ivan Illyich, how many die without experiencing their redemptive self-
revelations? Less dramatically, I have suggested elsewhere that the purpose 
of much successful psychotherapy is to lead a person f rom feeling unman¬
ageably to manageably torn. If so, then "ambivalence" describes this more 
faithfully than "wholeheartedness." Relatedly, I have argued that there are 
important dimensions of moral psychology (such as kinds of forgiveness) 
that Davenport's wholeheartedness account cannot readily accommodate. 1 2 
1 2 For both of these points, see m y "Forgiveness and the Rat M a n : Kierkegaard, 'narrative 
unity ' and 'wholeheartedness' revisited," in Lippit t and Stokes, where 1 also sketch more 
differences between Davenport and Rudd's accounts than space here allows. 
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These critical suggestions notwithstanding, both these rich, carefully 
argued books make significant advances in developing positions their au¬
thors had previously sketched, but in ways that—to sceptics—raised as 
many questions as answers. The gap between Kierkegaardian narrativists 
and narratosceptics may now be narrower than hitherto. But the process 
of exploring the disagreement in detail has brought to the surface valuable 
discussions the content of which I suspect was previously unimagined by 
contributors on either side of the debate. 
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, by Derk Pereboom. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 219 pages. $45 (hardcover). 
LE1GH V1CENS, Augustana College (Sioux Falls, SD) 
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life presents a "reworked and expanded 
version" of the view that Derk Pereboom first developed thirteen years ago 
in Living Without Free Will1 (4). Pereboom's position may be categorized as 
free w i l l skepticism, the view that it is unlikely that we have the sort of 
free w i l l required for "basic desert" moral responsibility. While the book 
contains one new chapter on the possibility of rational deliberation, most 
chapters present updated versions of arguments for claims he has previ¬
ously defended. Pereboom evidently takes seriously objections that have 
been raised against his reasoning, spending a good portion of the book 
responding to them, and the newer material is exploratory in tone, giving 
the impression that he is open to further objections and modifications of 
his position. (At one point he even suggests that "the resolute incompati-
bilist" is as unreasonable as the "resolute compatibilist" and "confirmed 
agnostic" on the issue of the compatibility of free w i l l and determinism, 
since none is prepared to change her mind in light of further considerations 
(94).) The book as a whole provides the philosopher of free w i l l wi th much 
food for thought, and is admirable in its insistence that our practices of 
holding each other responsible are not immune to theoretical challenges, 
but must be considered (and reconsidered) in light of what we know and 
don't know about the nature and extent of human freedom. Below I raise 
a few critical questions about the structure and cogency of Pereboom's 
arguments for free w i l l skepticism, as presented in the first few chapters of 
his book, before going on to discuss the significance of his "articulation 
of [the] practical components" of his position, in the later chapters. 
1 N e w York: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 2001. 
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